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IN TI-lE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF TI-lE 
STATE OF UTAH 
OWEN M. COLLETT, CANTLA Y 
& TANZOLA. INC., and CLARK 
TANKLINES COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH. R. A. GOULD. and 
LANG TRANSPORA TION COR-
PORATION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7279 
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs 
It is our opinion that plaintiffs' original brief in this 
case contains the answers to the problems and questions 
suggested by the brief of the defendants. In the hope 
that a direct reply to some of the arguments of defendants 
wilJ be of assistance to the court, and for the purpose of 
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giving the court the· benefit of our examination of some of 
the records of the Publtc Service Commission, this reply 
brief is submitted. We shall follow the arrangement 
adopted by the defendants which has added subdivisions 
to the second of the three points of our argument. 
POINT I 
A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND 
NEC'ESSITY ISSUED BY THE PUBIJC SERVICE 
COMMISSION OF UTAH IS NOT A PROPERTY 
RIGHT AND CANNOT -BE TRANSFERRED WITH-
OUT TI-lE APPROVAL OF THE COMMISSION. 
Defendants offer no authority in support of their asser-
tion that a certificate of convenience and necessity entails a 
property right of some sort. Plaintiffs' brief at page 22 
refers to Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission, 67 Utah· 
222 at 235, 247 P. 284. At the cited page the Utah 
Supreme Court makes this statement: 
''Practically every proposition that is urged 
by plaintiffs counsel in their brief is considered 
and decided against their contention in the foregoing 
cases. For example: It is contended that Mr. 
Carling operated the stage line before the Utilities 
Act \!Vas adopted, and hence that he had acquired 
a property right vvhich he had a right to transfer to 
the plaintiff without being controlled by the 
commission. That contention is fully answered 
in Westhoven v. Pub. Util. Comm., Estabrook 
v. Pub. Util. C'omm. and Lane v. Whitaker, 
'' supra. 
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This seems a sufficient ans\Yer to the argun1ent of defendants. 
And Section 76-5-40 does not help defendants. 
,\uthorizing the transfer of a certificate in the event of 
death of the O\vner Section 76-5-40. U.C.A. 1943. refers 
to ''rights. pern1its. certificates or licenses" and vests these 
incorporeal rights \vith no characteristics not theretofore 
existing, except the right of transfer subject to the approval 
of the Public Service Commission in the event of ·death 
of the holder. If the property right contended for by 
defendants existed, the right of transfer would be implied, 
rather than require legislative authorization before transfer 
could be pennitted. 
POINT II 
THE PUBLIC SER\llCE COMMISSION OF Ur-fAH 
HAS NO AUTHORIT'{ TO TRANSFER A CER-
TIFICATE OF PLIBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NE-
CESSIT'{ IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF 
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY. 
SUBDIVISION 1. Under subdivision 1 the defendants 
refer to the statutes and the Commission's regulations. 
Defendants do not refer to the prior rules promulgated by 
the Public Service Commission quoted at pages 29 and 30 
of plaintiffs' brief. \Ve deem it significant that the prior 
rules prohibited transfers of certificates. The present 
rules repeat that same rule and then proceed to authorize 
a transfer by a procedure \vhich is set out as a cancellation 
dnd re-issue. \V e point out. also. that there \Vas no 
:'tct tutory change vvhich justified the Commission in setting up a 
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procedure for making these transfers at that time and the 
rule under which this procedure was brought appears to be 
simply an· usurpation of authority. 
Defendants also refer to Section 76-4-32, U.C.A .. 
1943, as to which at this place in our reply brtef we point 
out two facts: ( 1) This section is a part of Chapter 68 
of the Laws of Utah, 1935, which related to consolidation, 
merger, and combination of public utilities and refers to 
acquisition of control by purchase of property or of stock. 
and nothing in that chapter can be interpreted as granting 
authority to transfer certificates of convenience and necessity 
unless the authority already existed, nor does anything in 
the language seem to suggest that incorporeal rights in a 
license or certificate are \vithin the words ''properties'' or 
"facilities"; (2) The same year that Chapter 68, Laws 
of 1935, was enacted, Chapter 65 was also enacted which 
deals with motor transport corporations. From that date 
on, the motor transport chapter should control transfers 
of operating rights and of properties of motor carriers, rather 
than the earlier chapter which deals primarily with utilities 
having immovable assets as their operating properties. 
SUBDIVISION 2. Under defendants' subdivision 2 
they discuss the Gilmer case, supra. Of course, as pointed 
out in our brief at page 37, the question of the right to 
transfer a certificate of convenience and necessity was not 
before the Supreme Court in the Gilmer case, the action 
appealed from having been a later action questioning ex-
pan~ion of service by the transferee, there having been no 
challenge in the Supreme Court of the transfer and no 
continuation before the Public Service Commission of the 
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protests against the transfer. We agree with defendants 
in our inability to have found any case in this Court passing 
upon this question or any other case where this Court has 
had before it a certificate of convenience and necessity 
previously transferred to one of the parties. The interesting 
thing about the Gilmer case should be the reason for 
failure to appeal to the Supreme Court the order allowing 
the transfer of the certificate of convenience and necessity 
originally issued to Joseph Carling and transferred by him 
to T. M. Gilmer in 1924 with the approval of the Com-
mission. This court can take judicial notice of the report 
and order of the Commission in that transfer case. It was 
Case No. 690 before the Commission, entitled ''In the 
Matter- of the Transfer of a Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity from Joseph Carling to T. M. Gilmer," resulting 
in the issuance of Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
No. 214. It was strongly argued by the protestants in 
that case that the Commission had no authority to transfer 
a certificate of convenience and necessity and that it had 
to consider the application as though it were a new application 
for a certificate. The Commission referred to the statute, 
Section 4818, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, and- to the 
language thereof which made it applicable to a public utility 
which would ''henceforth establish or begin the construction or 
operation" of a carrier. (This quoted language still exists in 
Section 76-4 .. 24, U.C.A., 1943.) The Commission under-
scored this quoted language in its report and said: 
"This case Inay be differentiated from those 
cases where the Commission granted certificates 
of convenience and necessity to automobile 
common carriers establishing or beginning their 
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operation after the passage of the Public Utilities 
Act." 
And it is significant that after that case was decided 
the Public Utilities Commission prornulgated its rules effective 
July 6, 1933, designed to carry out Chapter 53, Session 
La\vs of Utah, 1933, and ruled against transfer or assignment 
of certificates, as pointed out at page 29 of plaintiffs' brief. 
This was based on section 7 of said Chapter 53 which became 
Section 76-5-18, U.C.A., 1943. which is not restricted to 
establishment of a common carrier operation, but whtch says 
simply: 
''It shall be unlawful for any common motor 
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate commerce 
within this state \vithout first having obtained 
from. the Commission a certificate of convenience 
and necessity.·' 
Thus the basis of the Commission's decision in the Gilmer 
case was removed ·by the legislature in 1933, and this was 
reflected in the Commission's rules of 1933. 
SUBDIVISION 3. Defendants' subdivision 3 deals 
with administrative interpretation of the statute and refers to a 
few well-recognized rules but does not take .cognizance of 
two factors: 
( 1 ) The administrative interpretation for eleven years 
which defendants rely on was broken by the positive 
legislative pronouncement in 1941 authorizing transfer 
of operating rights of deceased owners by enactment 
: of Chapter 64, Laws of Utah, 1941. If Rule li 
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relied on by the defendants were the law in 194 1 , the 
legislative enactment \\'ould have been superfluous 
as the Cornmission already had authority to transfer 
a right which was not personal to the owner without 
a showing of public convenience and necessity. And 
if the legislature had wanted' to permit transfers of 
operating rights in all cases and not restrict such to 
instances where the ovvner is deceased, the legislature 
would have so provided. The language of the act 
and the scheme for effectuating the transfer strongly 
suggest that the scheme in Rule II was either not 
known to the legislature or \\'as being disapproved 
bY it. 
( 2) At page 18 of their brief defendants quote 
from Black on Interpretation of Lavvs, Second Edition, 
Section 94. The portion quoted is taken fron1 a 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State Board 
of Land Commissioners Y. Rtrie, 56 Utah 213 .. and 
the asterisks appearing at page 18 of the brief appear 
likewise in the Supreme Court decision. ln the place 
\vhere the second set of asterisks appear Black makes 
this statement: 
''And if the statute to be construed is a 
recent one - - so that official action cannot be 
seriously deranged. nor private rights be very much 
affected, by a change in its interpretation - - the 
mere fact that subordinate officers have alreadv 
begun to read it in a certain Yva y ~nd to regulat~ 
their action accordingly \\'ill have no weight or 
influence with the courts in their search for the 
true meaning of the law." 
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As applied to the facts of this case, the rule stated 
by Black suggests that any administrative interpretation 
should be ignored. There is no showing or suggestion 
that applicants for motor carrier permits have obtained them 
in the belief that they were transferable and no showing that 
any person will be damaged by a ruling that they are not 
transferable. An examination of the public records of the 
Commission shows that in practically every case of a 
transfer there has been no protest and therefore no public 
question arises and no question of damage to private inter-
ests. 
SUBDIVISION 4. At page 18 to 20 defendants em-
phasize the number of transfer cases where the Commission 
has acted pursuant to Rule II. There is no showing or 
suggestion in the brief that any of these cases were pro-
Lested or contested or that anyone had any adverse interest 
in the transfer. 
One case which was contested was Case No. 2276 
in the matter of the application of Salt Lake City Lines 
and Utah Light & Traction Company for consent and 
approval of the CoJ;Ilmission to the acquisition by the former 
company of the transportation property of the latter company. 
This resulted in issuance of Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity No. 640 to the Salt Lake City Lines under a 
report and order dated July 12, 1944. This report shovvs 
that the price paid was based solely on the value of 
physical property, with no mention of any price being paid 
for a certificate of convenience and necessity ,although the 
petitioners requested cancellation of the certificates of the 
Traction Company and issuance of a certificate of con-
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venience and necessity to the Salt Lake City Lines. The 
report recites that the Board of Commissioners of Salt L,ake 
City had approved, ratified, and confirmed a transfer to 
Salt Lake City Lines of certain rights, privileges, and 
franchises theretofore granted to, held, possessed and exer-
cised by the Traction Company under which a license tax 
of not less than $5,000 and not more than $15,000 was 
payable annually to Salt Lake City. (Page 6 of report.) 
At page 8 the Commissio~ quoted Section 76-4-32, U.C.A., 
1943, as the controlling statute and thereafter examined 
into the fairness of the price paid for the physical properties, 
and whether the public interest was affected by acquisition 
of the property by a foreign holding company without any 
local stock ownership. At page 8 the Commission said: 
''There is no contention that public con-
venience and necessity does not require passenger 
transportation service in the area now served by 
Traction Company. There is no issue on this 
point. The question of public interest, however, 
becomes a matter at issue in the case now before 
~' 
us. 
Thus, the Commission expressly left open, as it had done 
many years earlier in the Gilmer case, the question of its 
right to make a transfer of a certificate against the protests 
of interested persons and without a showing of public con-
venience and necessity. In the Traction Company case 
that issue had been solved by the exclusive franchise issued 
by Salt Lake City and the failure of anyone to make a 
protest on this ground. 
Another contested transfer case was In re Fuller-
Toponce Truck Company, Cases 1747, 1748, 1749, de-
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cided by report and order dated August 12, 1935. In 
that proceeding a partnership sought to transfer its oper-
ating authority to a corporation formed by the partners. 
They sought cancellation of several certificates of convenience 
and necessity and re-issue to the corporation of one 
certificate. But it was stipulated by all the parties that 
the evidence of public convenience and necessity supporting 
issuance of the original certificates was part of the record 
in the transfer case and on that stipulation the Comrnission 
made a finding of public convenience and necessity. 
It therefore appears that, far from a uniform interpre-
tation as contended by the defendants, this is probably the 
first case where the Public Service Commission has squarely 
passed upon the question involved in this case, and so far 
as counsel on .both sides can determine the matter has not 
previously been submitted to this Court. 
SUBDIVISION 5. In this subdivision the defendants 
attempt to lift themselves by their own boot straps by 
quoting from the report and order undoubtedly prepared by 
them and signed by the Commission. There is no issue 
on the question whether the Commission adopted the de-
fendants' theory of the case. The issue here is whether 
the Commission had the authority to do vvhat i.t did. and 
the report and order which it signed contain an able ex-
position of the theory but hardly constitute authority for 
that position before this Court. 
SUBDIVISION. 6. The argument here is notable 
for its reference to two cases on page 26 defining the word 
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"facilities" and taken from a number of cases in Words 
and Phrases ,,·here "facilities" is defined. Other cases 
collected in \ \' onls and Phrases are different from those 
used by the defendants and none of them seems to have 
any application to the question before the Court. 
SUBDI\1ISION 7. Defendants argue under this 
subdiYision that Section 76-4-32 authorizes tra~sfers of 
certificates inter vivos and that Section 76-5-40 constitutes 
the same authority where the holder of a certificate is de-
ceased, and conclude at page 28 of their brief, in referring 
to 76-5-40: 
·'Its enactment rounds out the entire matter 
of acquisitions." 
We agree that 76-4-32 relates to acquisitions but do not 
find that word used in 76-5-40 where the question dealt 
\vith by the legislature \vas "transfer". 
'vVe note, also, that 76-4-32 relates only to acquiSI-
tions by an existing public utility, and presumably one doing 
business in this state under the definition of public utility 
at 76-2-1. 76-5-40 is not confined to a transfer' to a 
public utility but permits transfer of the rights of a de-
ceased owner to · any persop making application to the 
Commission and obtaining its approval as being fit, willing, 
and able to perform the required services, to conform to 
the provisions of the act and the requirements, rules, and 
regulations of the Commission. The theory of defend-
ants would leave completely unprovided for any applicant 
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except an operating public utility in this state, unless the 
would-be transferor were deceased. Ther~ is no nice 
precision of statutory control. There is only a statutory 
authority for transfers where the holder is deceased. The 
reason for this falls within the area of legislative discre-
tion and there is before the Court no challenge of that law 
as discriminatory. It represents the one statutory ex-
ception to the requirement of Section 76-5-18 that a 
common motor carrier shall not operate in this state without 
obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity in the 
manner established by that statute, which includes a show-
ing of public convenience and necessity. 
There is good reason back of the view taken by the 
legislature. Many certificates are issued to corporations 
and do not . lapse upon the death of an officer, even 
though the principal' stockholder. As a means of off-
setting this advantage the legislature permits the personal 
representatives to carry on a deceased carrier's business 
and to make a transfer to a qualified _person. 
But this is no sanction of dealing in certificates of 
convenience and necessity and bargaining to sell to the 
highest bidder a license or certificate bestowed by the state 
without cost or favor but in the public inter~ st. (See 
Estabrook v. Pub. Util. C'omm. of Ohio, 147 N.E. 761, 
762.) When a certificated carrier desires to go out of 
business, let all interested persons make application for a 
certificate and let them show that the public convenience 
and necessity at that time require issuance of a certificate. 
Should not other persons with applications pending be 
heard on the question of \vho gets the certificate if the 
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public convenience and necessity require it? (See Chicago 
Railways Co. ,. . Commerce Commission, et al., 336 Ill, 51 . 
167 N.E. 840, 67 A.L.R. 938, 955-956.) For instance. 
\V. S. Hatch \vas a protestant before the Commission in 
this case. { R. 535). His application for a certificate of 
convenience and necessity ',.as denied in part (Exhibit 25; 
R. 179) . He \vould like to have a certificate to replace 
Gould's if one is to be issued ( R. 179-181 ) . Should the 
certificate gravitate to the large foreign corporation which 
is able to buy Gould out, or should all applicants be 
heard? These are questions for the legislature and it 
has not acted unreasonably in permitting a transfer with-
out a showing of convenience and necessity only where the 
certificate holder is deceased. 
POINT III 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF lJTAH 
CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF TI-IE 
EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND 
NECESSITY BASED UPON EVIDENCE AT A 
PRIOR HEARING IN ANOTHER CASE. 
Defendants try at pages 28 to 31 of their brief to 
becloud the issue stated by us and which defendants appear 
to have contemplated in their arguments before the Public 
Service Commission and in the language of the report signed 
by the Commission. If the contention of plaintiff~ that 
there is no statutory authority for a transfer of a certificate 
of convenience without a showing of public convenience and 
necessity is sound, then defendants can prevail in thts 
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Court only on one of two theories: ( 1 ) that public con-
venience and necessity was shown in this case; or ( 2) 
that public convenience and necessity was shown in an 
earlier case and can be judicially noticed by the Com-
mission in this case. 
Of course, there is no contention that any public con-
venience and necessity was shown in the hearing before the 
Commission and the defendants did not directly ask the 
Commission to take judicial notice of the existence of 
public convenience and necessity as established at prior 
h~arings which involved different parties and different 
issues. We believe that the Utah cases cited at pages 38 
to 4 1 of our original. brief amply sustain point Ill of our 
argument. And we believe the passages quoted at pages 
32 to 38 of our original brief show that defendants 
apprehended the question raised by point Ill of our argu-
ment but did not meet it. 
CONCLUSION 
The Public Service Commission, in permitting a transfer 
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity \\'here the 
holder is not deceased is acting beyond statutory authority. 
To call the process a cancellation and re-issue of a new 
certificate when no showipg of public convenience and 
necessity is required is simply a recognition by the Com-
mission that it knew it had no authority to permit a transfer. 
There being no showing of public convenience and neces-
sity to the applicant Lang Transportation Corporati.on, this 
Court should rule that the Public Service Commission ex-
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ceeded its jurisdiction, should reYerse the order of the Public 
Service Con1mission and direct that a further hearing be 
held either in this case or in the pending application of l__Jang 
Transportation Corporation ( R. 211 ) for issuance of a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity so that the 
question of public convenience and necessity can be deter-
mined. 
Respectfully submitted, · 
COLLETT TANK LINES 
By Richards and Bird, Attorneys 
CANTLA Y & TANZOLA, INC. 
By Lamoreaux and Tuft, Attorneys 
CLARK TANKLINES COMPAN'{ 
By Callister, Callister and Lewis, 
Attorneys 
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